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The Restatement of Gay(?) 
Courtney G. Joslin† & Lawrence C. Levine†† 
INTRODUCTION 
This Symposium—the “Restatement Of . . .” conference—
brings together scholars with expertise in a range of subject-
matter fields to consider existing Restatements and whether 
new Restatements are in order. The specific question we ask is 
whether there should be a Restatement or other type of American 
Law Institute (ALI) publication1 devoted to legal issues affecting 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people; or, to put 
it in a less cumbersome but more crude fashion, whether the ALI 
should produce The Restatement of Gay.2 
 
 † Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law. I thank Afra Afsharipour, 
Susan Frelich Appleton, David Horton, Melissa Murray, Dennis Ventry, and Rose 
Cuison Villazor for helpful feedback. I am grateful to the UC Davis School of Law, 
particularly Dean Kevin Johnson and Associate Dean Vikram Amar, for providing 
generous financial support for this project. Finally, I thank the editors of the Brooklyn 
Law Review for their careful editorial assistance.  
 †† Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I 
greatly appreciate the able research assistance of Pacific McGeorge students Vignesh 
Ganapathy, Danielle Lenth, and Vallerye Mosquera. I am also grateful to Professors 
Anita Bernstein, Julie Davies, Michael Green, and Brian Landsberg for their helpful 
input. Finally, my thanks to Brooklyn Law School, the Brooklyn Law Review, the ALI, 
and Professor Anita Bernstein for inviting us to participate in this Symposium. 
 1 Although Restatements are the most well-known of the ALI’s publications, 
the ALI publishes a number of different types of publications. Restatements were the 
“ALI’s first endeavor.” ALI Overview, A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
about.instituteprojects (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). Although this description is 
certainly open to debate, the ALI describes Restatements as documents that seek to 
“tell judges and lawyers what the law [is].” Id. In addition to these more familiar 
Restatements, the ALI also publishes a number of uniform or model statutory formulations, 
including the Uniform Commercial Code, the Model Code of Evidence, and the Model Penal 
Code. Most recently, the ALI has produced a number of “Principles of the Law.” In contrast to 
Restatements, which often seek to a greater degree to “describ[e] the law as it is,” Principles 
forthrightly seek to “express[ ] the law as it should be, which may or may not reflect the law as 
it is.” Publications Catalog, A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.faq 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
 2 Because the word “gay” is used primarily to refer to men, many lesbian, 
bisexual, and transgender people prefer more inclusive phrases to “gay rights” or the 
“gay community.” See, e.g., American Defamation League, Unheard Voices: Stories of 
LGBT History 5 (2011), http://archive.adl.org/education/curriculum_connections/
unheard-voices/pdfs/entire_unit.pdf. While we share these concerns, we use the term 
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After thinking about the question independently and 
then discussing it together, we both answered the question in 
the negative. But, as explained in more detail below, that does 
not mean we think the ALI need not address LGBT issues. In 
fact, we think just the opposite is true. Given the influence that 
ALI publications have on the development of the law, we think 
it is critically important for the ALI to engage with and address 
the law as it applies or should apply to LGBT people. But we 
think that this engagement should be in the context of the 
relevant subject-matter publications, rather than in the form of 
a separate, stand-alone publication dedicated to LGBT issues. 
Part I of this article develops why we think it is critical 
for the ALI to more comprehensively consider and address 
LGBT issues. Part II explains why we advocate an inclusive 
rather than an exclusive approach for such consideration. We 
discuss an ALI publication—the Model Penal Code—to help 
explain why we support such an approach. 
Part III provides some concrete examples of how this 
inclusive approach could be implemented. We start by offering 
some guidance as to what types of provisions are most likely to 
be in need of reconsideration and possible revision. Such 
provisions include those that turn in some way on the existence 
of a legally recognized relationship. As we explain, these 
provisions exclude most LGBT couples. Moreover, these 
provisions are increasingly out-of-step with the demographics 
of families in the United States and have a disproportionately 
negative effect on lower-income families and families of color. 
Other provisions that may be in need of reconsideration are 
those that relate to discriminatory conduct.3 To provide more 
clarity about what we advocate, we offer one example of an ALI 
publication that already does a good job of incorporating LGBT 
issues—the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution—as 
well as an example of an ALI publication that needs further 
revision—the Restatement (Third) of Torts. 
I. IMPORTANCE OF THE ALI 
Without question, we both believe it is critically 
important for the ALI to engage with LGBT issues in its 
publications. As other scholars have noted, “‘authorship’ of the 
                                                                                                             
“gay” here in the proposed title because it is less cumbersome than the alternatives. In 
the body of the piece, we use the more inclusive term “LGBT.” 
 3 See infra Part III.D. 
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American Law Institute serves a strong legitimizing function.”4 
ALI publications are the collaborative product of leading scholars, 
lawyers, and judges. Indeed, ALI projects are unusual in that 
they bring together experts from both practice and academia. As a 
result, many (although not all) of the ALI’s publications have had 
tremendous influence on the development of the law in states, 
spanning the geographical and political spectrum. 
The degree of influence varies by publication and subject 
matter. Some ALI publications have had a profound impact on 
the development of the law. The Model Penal Code, the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), and the Restatements of Torts arguably 
fall into this category.5 The UCC, for example, has been adopted 
and implemented at least in part by all 50 states.6 “In the realm 
of substantive criminal law, by far the most significant 
development has been the completion of the American Law 
Institute’s Model Penal Code[.]”7 And the Restatement of Torts is 
an example of a non-Model Code publication that has heavily 
influenced the development of state law.8 
 
 4 Mary Coombs, Insiders and Outsiders: What the American Law Institute 
Has Done for Gay and Lesbian Families, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 87, 88-89 
(2001); see also Michael D. Green & Olivier Moréteau, Restating Tort Law: The 
American and European Styles, 3 J. EUR. TORT LAW 281, 285 (2012) (“By all accounts, 
the ALI has had enormous success in influencing the development of the common law 
in the US.”); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Introduction, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: 
CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION 1, 2 n.5 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) [hereinafter RECONCEIVING 
THE FAMILY] (“It is difficult to overstate the degree of the ALI’s influence. As of March 
1, 2004, state and federal courts have cited the Restatements 161,486 times.”); Carl E. 
Schneider, Afterword: Elite Principles: The ALI Proposals and the Politics of Law 
Reform, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra, at 489, 491 (“The ALI has wielded 
influence beyond the fantasies of its founders. The Model Penal Code and the 
Restatements are as close to binding precedent as nongovernmental authority can be, 
and they are only part of the Institute’s agenda.”). 
 5 Bennett Boskey, The American Law Institute: A Glimpse at Its Future, 12 
GREEN BAG 2D 255, 258 (2009) (“Perhaps the most influential has been the Model Penal 
Code adopted by the Institute in 1962, for which Herbert Wechsler was the reporter before 
he became the Institute’s director. The strong influence of this project and its wide 
acceptability helped to modernize the penal codes of many of the States[.]”). 
 6 Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
103, 146-47 (2008) (“The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is a leading example. 
Originally promulgated in 1952 and revised periodically since then, some version of the 
UCC is in force in all fifty states.”). 
 7 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 3 (2d ed. 1986); 
see also Sanford H. Kadish, The Model Penal Code’s Historical Antecedents, 19 
RUTGERS L.J. 521, 538 (1988) (“[T]he influence of the Model Penal Code has been so 
great that it has now permeated and transformed the substantive criminal law of this 
country.”); Richard G. Singer, Foreword, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 519, 519 (1988) (referring to 
the MPC as “one of the most historic documents in the history of the criminal law”). 
 8 Green & Moréteau, supra note 4, at 285 (“The three torts Restatements 
(the most popular and influential of all of the Restatements that the ALI has published) 
has been cited an estimated 70,000 times since the first one was published in 1934.”); 
Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 932 (2009) (“The classic 
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Other publications arguably have had less influence.9 For 
example, some commentators claim that the ALI’s Principles of 
the Law of Family Dissolution (Principles) has had little impact 
on the development of the law.10 Even allegedly less persuasive 
publications like the Principles, however, heavily influence the 
scholarly discussions and the way the subject matter is taught in 
law schools.11 For example, although no state has “adopted” the 
Principles, they are extensively discussed and analyzed in family 
law textbooks12 and have been the subject of scores of law review 
articles.13 Over time, this discussion likely will influence the 
development of the law, even if it is not directly attributed to 
the Principles. 
On the whole, these ALI publications have more influence 
on the development of the law than traditional legal scholarship. 
Professor Lawrence Waggoner recently reflected on his 
involvement with the ALI and the Uniform Law Commission 
(ULC), stating that this work was some of his most important as 
a law professor because it was only through these projects that 
he “was . . . able to influence the law.”14 
Both of us are interested in LGBT issues not only from a 
theoretical perspective, but also from a practical perspective. 
We care deeply about how the law and the legal system treat 
LGBT people. For this reason, we strongly support law reform 
                                                                                                             
example of an ALI process for improving state law is the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
which sets out Prosser’s privacy torts and heavily influences state law.”). 
 9 Here we discuss the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, but there 
are other examples one could use, including the Restatement of Surety. We thank 
Anita Bernstein for this insight. 
 10 See, e.g., Michael R. Clisham & Robin Fretwell Wilson, American Law 
Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years after Adoption: 
Guiding Principles or Obligatory Footnote?, 42 FAM. L.Q. 573, 608-09 (2008) (arguing 
that the ALI’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution have had an “anemic 
influence . . . with rule makers”). 
 11 See, e.g., JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED: RECASTING THE 
CANON 3 (forthcoming) (on file with author) (“How family law is taught helps 
determine how the next generation of lawyers, including some future legislators, 
regulators, and judges will understand family law and its guiding principles.”). 
 12 For example, the references to the PRINCIPLES in D. Kelly Weisberg & 
Susan Frelich Appleton’s MODERN FAMILY LAW (Aspen) take up almost an entire 
column of the index. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN 
FAMILY LAW 1172 (3d ed. 2006). 
 13 See, e.g., RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 4, at vii-ix (consisting of 
25 articles critiquing various parties of the Principles); see also Timothy Johnson, 
Editor’s Note, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y i (2001) (symposium issue devoted to 
consideration of the Principles). 
 14 Lawrence W. Waggoner, Why I Do Law Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
727, 731 (2012); see also id. at 738 (“Overriding all the other reasons, though, is the 
hope that the work has improved the law.”). 
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work, such as the work of the ALI. One of us15 has long been a 
member of the ALI and has had the good fortune of 
participating in the drafting of the Restatement (Third) of the 
Law of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm. The 
other,16 while not a member of the ALI, has participated in 
other law reform efforts.17 Because of the ALI’s unique ability 
to affect the development of the law and its application, we 
strongly support efforts by the ALI to address LGBT issues in a 
comprehensive and thoughtful way. 
Undertaking such a project is important from the ALI’s 
perspective as well. As the ALI itself explains, the goal of the 
organization is to “clarify, modernize, and otherwise improve 
the law.”18 LGBT issues are critical legal issues of our times, 
and the law on this subject is developing at a rapid pace. 
Moreover, LGBT issues cut across the range of subject-matter 
areas that the ALI already addresses, as well as those that the 
ALI is contemplating for inclusion in future projects.19 As such, 
LGBT issues are matters upon which the ALI must provide 
guidance in order to further its core goals of clarifying and 
modernizing the law. Consideration and inclusion of LGBT 
issues in ALI publications will also ensure that the ALI 
continues to be viewed as providing relevant and up-to-date 
guidance. The completion of such a project would be of great 
assistance to lawyers and judges trying to make sense of this 
rapidly changing body of law. 
II. INCLUSIVE OR EXCLUSIVE CONSIDERATION? 
Having concluded that it is important for the ALI to 
engage with LGBT issues, the next question is how this should 
be done. As we understood it, the specific question we were 
asked to consider was whether there should be a separate, 
stand-alone ALI publication on LGBT issues. For a number of 
 
 15 Professor Lawrence Levine. 
 16 Professor Courtney Joslin. 
 17 Author Joslin participated in the drafting of the revised version of the 
Uniform Parentage Act, which was promulgated by the ULC in 2002. See, e.g., John J. 
Sampson, Preface to the Amendments to the Uniform Parentage Act (2002), 37 FAM. 
L.Q. 1, 3 n.5 (2003). She is also a member of a new ULC study committee that is tasked 
with “consider[ing] the need for and feasibility of drafting and enacting state 
legislation concerning the rights of third parties to custody of or visitation with a child.” 
For more information about this project see Committees: Third Party Child Custody and 
Visitation, UNIFORM L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=
Third%20Party%20Child%20Custody%20and%20Visitation (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
 18 ALI Overview, supra note 1. 
 19 See, e.g., infra Part III.B. 
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reasons developed in this Part, we believe that the development of 
a “Restatement of Gay” is not the best approach. To the contrary, 
we think that a more productive and helpful way to engage with 
LGBT issues would be for the ALI to comprehensively 
incorporate LGBT issues into all of its relevant existing and 
future publications. 
As a starting place for thinking about this question, we 
note that the ALI does not have any publications specifically 
devoted to the application of law to any other identity-based 
group.20 For example, there is no Restatement of Race or 
Restatement of Gender.21 And, as is true with regard to LGBT 
identity, we do not advocate the creation of such publications. 
But, again as is true with LGBT identity, we do strongly urge 
the ALI to consciously and deliberately reflect on whether 
existing publications do a good job of taking into account these 
social identities and the law’s impact on people in these social 
identity categories. There has been some attempt to do this—
largely with regard to the application of particular provisions of 
particular publications to women.22 So, for example, some 
Restatements have been revised to replace gendered terms 
(generally gendered male in the past) with gender-neutral 
terms.23 That said, as scholars such as Anita Bernstein,24 
 
 20 Although the ALI is currently considering a project on American Indian law. 
See, e.g., ALI Considers Possible Project on American Indian Law, 34 A.L.I. REP. 3 (2012), 
http://www.ali.org/_news/reporter/spring2012/03-ali-considers-possible-project-american-
indian-law.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). We think, however, that that publication is 
distinguishable in that Native American law is a distinct body of law. 
  In her contribution to this symposium, Susan Appleton advocates the 
creation of another identity-specific ALI publication—one considering the legal 
treatment of children. Susan Frelich Appleton, Restating Childhood, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 
525 (2014). As she explains, however, legal issues related to children are different from 
issues affecting most other identity-based categories—including LGBT identity—because 
children are, and in many instances should be, treated in unique ways by the law. 
 21 See, e.g., Publications Catalog, A.L.I., supra note 1. 
 22 See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Toward More Parsimony and Transparency in 
“the Essentials of Marriage,” 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83, 115 (2011) (noting that the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS “switched its old topic heading for [Section 21, 
the section on domicile,] ‘Married Women, Children, and Incompetents’ to the neutral-
sounding ‘Acquisition and Change of Domicil’”). 
 23 Martha Chamallas, Gaining Some Perspective in Tort Law: A New Take on 
Third-Party Criminal Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1351, 1357 (2010) 
(“[T]he Restatement (Second) used explicitly gendered language, defining negligence as 
the failure to act as a ‘reasonable man under like circumstances’ . . . . In contrast to its 
predecessor, the Restatement (Third) scrupulously uses gender-neutral language 
throughout, relying on inclusive terms such as ‘person’ and ‘actor.’”). 
 24 See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles 
and the Prescription of Masculine Order, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2001) (arguing 
that “the General Principles look at Torts from a gendered perspective: mostly (but far 
from uniformly) male”). 
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Martha Chamallas,25 and Jennifer Wriggins26 explain, much 
more work needs to be done on this front.27 And the need for 
further reflection and revision is no less great with regard to 
LGBT people.28 
So, consciously or not, it appears that the ALI previously 
chose to address issues of gender within existing publications 
rather than through the creation of a separate, stand-alone 
Restatement of Gender. We advocate a similar approach here. 
As discussed in more detail in Part III, how this 
inclusion should be accomplished will vary depending on the type 
of provision and the existing law. In some places, the drafters may 
need to consider altering the rules to assure fair and equal 
treatment of LGBT people. Some alteration may be necessary, for 
example, with regard to provisions that turn on the existence of a 
marital relationship. In other places, by contrast, all that may be 
needed is more explicit guidance that whatever the announced 
principles are, they apply equally to LGBT people. 
A. Limitations of an LGBT-Specific Publication 
1. Risk of Marginalization 
Addressing LGBT issues in a separate, stand-alone 
publication would limit the scope of the potential audience. 
Those lawyers and advocates who do not currently serve many 
LGBT clients, and who may have given less thought and 
reflection to these issues, would be much less likely to make use of 
 
 25 See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration 
from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2115-16 (2007) 
[hereinafter Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage]; Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights 
in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender and the Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1435, 1436 (2005). 
 26 Jennifer B. Wriggins, Toward a Feminist Revision of Torts, 13 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 139, 139-40 (2005) [hereinafter Wriggins, Feminist Revision]; 
Jennifer B. Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CALIF. L. REV. 121, 184 (2001). 
 27 For a very thoughtful and deep examination of the extent to which torts 
doctrine, including the Restatement of Torts, fails adequately to take into account 
considerations of race and gender, see MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, 
THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 1 (2010). 
 28 See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Essay, Citizen Spouse, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 426 
(2013) (noting that although the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS made the 
domicile provision gender-neutral, “the Reporter’s Note acknowledges that the gender-
neutral change to the title is purely semantic”); Wriggins, Feminist Revision, supra 
note 26, at 139 (“discuss[ing] some of what feminist perspectives can provide in 
connection with torts”); Dolly M. Trompeter, Comment, Sex, Drugs, and the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, Section 6(c): Why Comment e is the Answer to the Woman 
Question, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 1145 (1999) (considering application of Section 6(c) of 
the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS to women). 
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an LGBT-specific publication. The existence of a stand-alone ALI 
publication on LGBT issues would also reinforce the intuition of 
many that LGBT issues are marginal, and unworthy of 
consideration in the “true” or “core” ALI publications. 
One of us is the author of several publications that focus 
exclusively on LGBT legal issues.29 We hope that these 
publications demonstrate that there are benefits from creating 
and publishing LGBT-specific publications. In some contexts and 
for some purposes, this type of publication makes sense. 
Publications devoted to a comprehensive analysis of LGBT legal 
issues can be of great use to lawyers who devote a significant 
portion of their practice to serving LGBT people and their 
families. The existence of this type of publication means that 
there is one publication that these lawyers can turn to for 
information about many, if not most, of the issues they face in 
their practice. Without such publications, these lawyers may 
instead have to turn to many different publications every time 
they need guidance. Moreover, publications devoted to the 
LGBT subject matter might be easier to find in the first 
instance because they clearly identify themselves as providing 
a comprehensive overview of a particular area of practice. So, 
for those people who know they need information about an 
LGBT issue, an LGBT-specific publication might be the most 
useful source. 
There are a number of potential downsides, however, to 
addressing LGBT issues in a separate, stand-alone publication. 
As a preliminary matter, addressing LGBT issues only in an 
LGBT-specific publication would drastically reduce the number 
of people who would consider and grapple with the subject 
matter. Most of the users of an LGBT-specific ALI publication 
likely would be people who write on the topic or lawyers whose 
practice includes a significant number of LGBT clients. There 
simply are not that many people who fall into these categories. 
Moreover, while lawyers who serve LGBT clients likely could 
learn more about LGBT issues from a comprehensive, LGBT-
 
 29 See, e.g., COURTNEY G. JOSLIN & SHANNON P. MINTER, LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW (West 2012); see also NAN D. HUNTER, 
COURTNEY G. JOSLIN, & SHARON M. MCGOWAN, THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS, GAY MEN, 
BISEXUALS, AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE: AN AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
HANDBOOK (Eve Cary ed., 4th ed. 2004). 
  And, of course, many other scholars and lawyers have written books on 
legal issues specific to the LGBT community. See, e.g., JOAN M. BURDA, ESTATE 
PLANNING FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES (2d ed. 2013); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY 
RIGHTS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW (2002). 
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specific ALI publication, this group of lawyers likely has 
already done a fair amount of thinking about these issues. 
By contrast, people who consider LGBT issues to be 
unrelated to their existing area of practice or expertise would 
be less likely to utilize such a publication. This group of people 
probably is much larger than the former group. And, as a 
whole, this larger group of lawyers likely has done much less 
thinking about LGBT issues and, therefore, has the most to 
learn. To try to put some perspective on the relative sizes of these 
two groups, the American Bar Association, which includes only a 
slice of all licensed lawyers in this country, has “more than 
400,000 members.”30 By contrast, the National LGBT Bar 
Association—an association dedicated to LGBT lawyers and 
attorneys serving LGBT clients—has approximately 2,500 
members.31 Thus, an LGBT-specific ALI publication likely 
would be utilized primarily by a relatively small group of 
people who already know a fair amount about LGBT issues. 
In some ways, this question of incorporation versus 
exclusive consideration is related to the debate about how to 
include LGBT and other identity-based issues into the law 
school curriculum. Having specific seminars addressing LGBT 
issues, gender, or race is a positive step. These classes enable 
students who are already knowledgeable about and interested 
in a particular topic to explore it more deeply. But these classes 
do not mitigate the need to incorporate these issues into the 
core law school curriculum. As Cheryl Wade has explained in 
the context of race: 
Ignoring issues of race in the law school’s core courses and relegating 
such issues to Law and Race and Critical Race Theory seminars 
disserves my students. Discussions of race become marginalized, 
exiled to the fringes of the law school curriculum. Only the students 
who enroll in “race courses” have available opportunities to discuss 
race and racism.32 
 
 30 See, e.g., About the ABA Journal, AM. BAR ASS’N J., http://www.abajournal.com/
about (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
 31 Email from Liz Youngblood, Program Manager, National LGBT Bar 
Association, to authors (June 20, 2013 9:13AM) (on file with authors). And, likely, 
many of these lawyers do not practice primarily in the area of LGBT rights. 
 32 Cheryl L. Wade, Attempting to Discuss Race in Business and Corporate 
Law Courses and Seminars, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 901, 904-05 (2003) (footnote 
omitted). Many other scholars likewise argue that it is important to incorporate issues 
of race, class, gender, etc. into the core law school curriculum. See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams 
Crenshaw, Foreward: Toward a Race-Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 4 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 33, 33-34 (1994); see also Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing Race from 
Legal Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 51, 55 (1994). 
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Especially within an ALI publication that has a good 
chance of actually influencing and impacting the development 
of the law, it is critical not to marginalize identity-based issues 
like sexual orientation and gender identity. It is important to 
incorporate these issues into the existing doctrine in a conscious, 
thoughtful, and deliberate manner. 
2. Discouraging Connections 
Addressing LGBT issues in a stand-alone publication 
can inhibit rather than enable the ability of scholars, lawyers, 
and judges to see the connections between legal issues affecting 
LGBT people and those affecting non-LGBT people. Failing to 
see the connections between related legal issues is of particular 
concern in the LGBT context.33 There is already a tendency to 
see legal issues affecting LGBT people as utterly distinct from 
those affecting non-LGBT people. Having an LGBT-specific 
publication may fuel rather than break this cycle. 
Bowers v. Hardwick34 is a striking example of this 
tendency. Bowers involved a constitutional challenge to a Georgia 
sodomy statute. The statute criminalized oral and anal sex 
regardless of the sex, sexual orientation, or marital status of the 
participants.35 Because of its broad scope, the statute was initially 
challenged by two sets of plaintiffs: a gay man who had been 
arrested and charged for violating the statute,36 and a 
heterosexual married couple who claimed the statute chilled 
their sexual activity.37 
 
 33 See, e.g., Charlton C. Copeland, Creation Stories: Stanley Hauerwas, Same-
Sex Marriage, and Narrative in Law and Theology, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 87, 88 
(2012) (“The translation of LGBT lives to the larger public has been one of the most 
significant strategies of the mainstream LGBT equality movement.”). 
 34 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 35 The statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1984), criminalized sodomy, which 
was defined as follows: “A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or 
submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus 
of another.” See Brief for Petitioner, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-
140), 1986 WL 720442, at *5 (authored by Laurence Tribe and Kathleen Sullivan) (“In 
Section 16-6-2, the State of Georgia has criminalized certain sexual activities defined 
solely by the parts of the body they involve, no matter who engages in them, with 
whom, or where.”). 
 36 “After a preliminary hearing, the District Attorney decided not to present the 
matter to the grand jury unless further evidence developed.” Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188. 
 37 See id. at 188 n.2 (“John and Mary Doe were also plaintiffs in the action. 
They alleged that they wished to engage in sexual activity proscribed [by the statute] 
in the privacy of their home, . . . and that they had been ‘chilled and deterred.’”). 
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By the time the case was decided by the Supreme Court, 
the married couple had been dismissed from the lawsuit.38 With 
Michael Hardwick as the sole remaining challenger to the law, 
the Court reframed the issue as one implicating only LGBT 
people. According to the Court, the question presented by the case 
was whether “the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental 
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.”39 It was only by 
reframing the question in this way—that is, by entirely 
distancing the statute from any impact on or relevance to 
heterosexual people—that the Court reached the conclusion 
that the claims presented in the case bore “no connection” to 
“family, marriage, or procreation.”40 
If the Court had not engaged in this kind of siloing or 
ghettoizing of LGBT issues, it would have had to answer the 
astute question posed by Justice Stevens in his dissent. That is, 
the Court would have had to explain why some persons in 
Georgia, namely lesbian and gay people, did not have “the 
same interest in ‘liberty’ that others ha[d].”41 
We believe that discrimination against LGBT people 
will not be eliminated until courts and policymakers are forced 
to appreciate the connections between legal issues as they 
affect LGBT and non-LGBT people.42 Having a separate LGBT-
specific publication would, we think, obscure these connections 
rather than bring them into focus. 
 
 38 Id. (noting that the district court had dismissed the heterosexual couple on 
standing grounds, that this holding was affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and that the 
couple “[did] not challenge that holding in this Court”). 
 39 Id. at 190. 
 40 Id. at 191 (“Accepting the decisions in these cases and the above 
description of them, we think it evident that none of the rights announced in those 
cases bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to 
engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case. No connection between family, 
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has 
been demonstrated[.]”). 
 41 Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Almost twenty years later, the Court 
did make this connection between the rights of LGBT people and the rights of non-
LGBT people when it overruled Bowers. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) 
(“Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as 
heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them this right.”). See 
generally Lawrence C. Levine, Justice Kennedy’s “Gay Agenda”: Romer, Lawrence, and 
the Struggle for Marriage Equality, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 10-16 (2013). 
 42 To be clear, seeing connections between LGBT and non-LGBT people does 
not necessarily mean one advocating for LGBT rights must employ a “we are just like 
straight” people argument. See, e.g., Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s Horizon, 54 EMORY 
L.J. 1361, 1368-75 (2005) (examining the “like-straight reasoning” employed in Goodridge v. 
Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003)). The point is simply to emphasize the 
importance of seeing LGBT people as people who should be entitled to the same rights and 
protections as other people even if they are not “just like” straight people. 
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B. Benefits of Inclusion 
1. Moving the Ball Forward Faster 
An inclusive, rather than an exclusive, approach also 
holds the potential to move the law forward more quickly on 
controversial issues. A good example of this potential was 
demonstrated by one of the ALI’s own projects—the Model Penal 
Code (MPC). In May of 1955, the ALI approved a tentative draft 
of the MPC that decriminalized all consensual sodomy, regardless 
of the actor’s sex or sexual orientation.43 
To be clear, despite their proposal to decriminalize same-
sex private sodomy, the ALI drafters certainly did not intend to 
further a “homosexual agenda.” Indeed, even though the MPC 
decriminalized private consensual same-sex sexual intimacy, the 
drafters nonetheless held the view that such conduct was deviant 
and something from which the public should be protected when 
not hidden from sight.44 Accordingly, the MPC continued to 
criminalize “loiter[ing] in or near any public place for the 
purpose of soliciting or being solicited to engage in deviate sexual 
relations.”45 And the accompanying comments made clear that the 
purpose of this provision was to prevent the “congregation of 
homosexuals offensively flaunting their deviance from general 
norms of behavior.”46 
Thus, in urging the decriminalization of sodomy, the 
MPC drafters were not seeking to promote LGBT rights. 
Instead, it was the byproduct of the approach they utilized. 
 
 43 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Hardwick and Historiography, 1999 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 631, 662 (1999) (“[T]he influential American Law Institute (ALI) narrowly voted 
in May 1955 to decriminalize consensual sodomy in a tentative draft of its proposed 
Model Penal Code.”); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: 
SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA 1861–2003, 124 (2008) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, 
DISHONORABLE PASSIONS] (“As earlier versions had done, the final MPC made [sodomy] 
a crime only if it was forcible (or its equivalent) or with a minor.”). 
 44 See, e.g., Louis B. Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 675-76 (1963) (noting that the MPC drew a line between private 
and public displays of “deviate sexuality”). 
 45 MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3 (1985). 
 46 Schwartz, supra note 44, at 675, 683 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.3, 
status note at 237). The status note provides: 
[T]he main objective is to suppress the open flouting of prevailing moral 
standards as a sort of nuisance in public thoroughfares and parks. In the case 
of females, suppression of professionals is likely to accomplish that objective. 
In the case of males, there is a greater likelihood that non-professional 
homosexuals will congregate and behave in a manner grossly offensive to 
other users of public facilities. 
Id. 
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Rather than considering homosexual sodomy in isolation, the 
drafters assessed the sodomy provisions in the context of broad 
review of all sex crimes. The need to revise these provisions 
was prompted in part by the Kinsey studies of the 1950s.47 
These studies showed that large numbers of adults—including 
large numbers of heterosexual adults—engaged in so-called 
“deviate” sexual activity.48 To the drafters, “the criminalization of 
conduct that most people thought was acceptable [such as 
fornication] threatened the very legitimacy of the law.”49 
Ultimately, the drafters concluded that only conduct that 
harmed third parties should be regulated by the criminal law.50 
The proposal to decriminalize all private sodomy—
including same-sex sodomy—may seem unsurprising today, but 
it was quite remarkable given the historical context in which 
the drafters were working. At the time of drafting “[i]n the 
1950s, gay [male] sex was illegal everywhere.”51 It was a time 
when “‘enlightened opinion’ held that homosexuality was a 
mental illness.”52 Further, the government was engaged in a 
“massive anti-homosexual campaign.”53 This campaign ranged 
from President Eisenhower’s 1953 executive order requiring 
the discharge of all gay and lesbian employees from any form of 
 
 47 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 43, at 121 
(noting that the MPC drafting committee “gathered reams of materials, including the 
Kinsey reports”); id. at 122 (noting that the comments to § 207.5 include data from the 
Kinsey reports). 
 48 See, e.g., Anders Walker, American Oresteia: Herbert Wechsler, the Model 
Penal Code, and the Uses of Revenge, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1017, 1032 (2009) (“Citing two 
reports by University of Indiana Professor Alfred Kinsey, Wechsler[,] [the Chief 
Reporter of the MPC,] noted that ‘a large proportion of the population is guilty at one 
time or another’ of adultery, while pre-marital intercourse was ‘very common and 
widely tolerated.’” (footnote omitted)). 
 49 Id. 
 50 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1 cmt. at 207 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 
1955) (“The Code does not attempt to use the power of the state to enforce purely moral 
or religious standards. We deem it inappropriate for the government to attempt to 
control behavior that has no substantial significance except as to the morality of the 
actor. Such matters are best left to religious, educational and other social influences.”); 
id. cmt. at 277-78 (“No harm to the secular interests of the community is involved in 
atypical sex practice in private between consenting adult partners. This area of private 
morals is the distinctive concern of spiritual authorities. . . . [T]here is the fundamental 
question of the protection to which every individual is entitled against state 
interference in his personal affairs when he is not hurting others.”). 
 51 Arthur S. Leonard, Thoughts on Lawrence v. Texas, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 
171, 172 (2005) (“In the 1950s, gay sex was illegal everywhere in the United States, as 
it had been since the dawn of our nation.”). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Brief of Professors of History George Chauncey et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 
152350, at *16 [hereinafter Historians’ Brief in Lawrence]. 
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federal employment,54 to the FBI’s so-called Sex Deviant 
Program, which sought to root out homosexuals by spying on 
individuals alleged to be gay or lesbian and to spread rumors of 
purported homosexuality.55 
As William Eskridge explains, “[d]ecriminalization [of 
sodomy] would have been impossible [during this time] if 
legislators had thought that they were advancing civil rights for 
homosexuals.”56 The decriminalization of gay sodomy was 
achieved only by couching these changes within a broad scale 
criminal law reform effort that impacted the lives of a wide 
spectrum of the American public, including but not limited to 
LGBT people. 
The promulgation of the MPC certainly did not result in 
the speedy or full-scale repeal of all sodomy statutes. Repeals 
were fairly slow to come. But, come they did. By 1979, 17 years 
after the MPC was completed (in 1962), “[24] states . . . had 
decriminalized consensual sodomy.”57 States that maintained 
anti-sodomy statutes rarely enforced them. When states did 
charge someone with sodomy, the charge was usually a tag-
along charge along with rape. The sodomy charge assured a 
criminal conviction even in cases where all of the elements of 
rape could not be established.58 
Of course, it is not always the case that inclusive 
approaches are the most expedient paths to large-scale change. 
Arguably, the adoption of same-sex domestic partnership 
legislation is an example to the contrary. That is, one could argue 
that states were more willing to adopt these alternative legal 
relationship statuses because they would extend rights only to a 
limited subset of unmarried couples: same-sex couples. If, by 
contrast, these alternative statuses were viewed as a broad-
scale attempt to make marriage matter less, states might have 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 “J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI . . . also played a key role—through a ‘Sex Deviates’ 
program that Hoover initiated in 1951—in spying on alleged homosexuals, 
disseminating rumors of homosexuality, and purging homosexuals from government 
service.” David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and 
the Secret Subtext of Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 906 (2008). Local 
police departments likewise “stepped up their raids on bars and private parties.” 
Historians’ Brief in Lawrence, supra note 53, at *19. 
 56 ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 43, at 138. 
 57 Id. at 201 (also noting that “two states recriminalized it after a short period”). 
 58 Mitchell Lloyd Pearl, Note, Chipping Away at Bowers v. Hardwick: Making 
the Best of an Unfortunate Decision, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 154, 156-57 (1988) (“Though 
sodomy statutes are rarely used—at present—against consenting heterosexual adults, 
they are often used against persons charged with sexual assault or abuse when there is 
doubt on the issue of consent.” (footnote omitted)). 
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been less likely to adopt them. For example, as Douglas NeJaime 
explains, California’s groundbreaking domestic partnership law 
was largely limited to same-sex couples59 as then-Governor Gray 
Davis had “expressed his resistance to a bill that included 
different-sex couples because such inclusion threatened to 
minimize the importance of marriage by providing a nonmarital 
choice to those who could otherwise marry.”60 
While there are some examples to the contrary, 
advances regarding LGBT rights often have occurred when 
courts, policy makers, and the public recognized the connections 
between the rights and general humanity of LGBT and non-
LGBT people.61 
2. Encouraging Holistic Reflection and Engagement 
Addressing LGBT issues in an inclusive way better 
enables one to appreciate the underlying cause of unfair or 
anachronistic rules and principles. By contrast, addressing 
LGBT issues through a separate publication might prompt the 
creation of solutions that resolve only part of a larger problem; it 
is almost always the case that the rules that apply unfairly to 
LGBT people harm other people as well. In particular, such 
rules also tend to have a disproportionately negative effect on 
other vulnerable groups, including people of color, lower income 
people, and women. An inclusive approach would encourage 
comprehensive, rather than partial, reforms. 
As discussed in more detail below, the two types of rules 
deserving reform are those that turn on the existence of a 
marriage or other legally recognized relationship and those that 
 
 59 As a compromise position, the California law permitted different-sex 
couples to register if both members of the different-sex couple were 62 years of age or 
older. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. 93 (West). In 2001, California amended the law to permit 
different-sex couples to register so long as one member was 62 years of age or older. 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004); 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. 91 (West). 
 60 Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital 
Recognition and its Impact on Marriage, 102 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (on file 
with authors) (“While inclusion of same-sex couples did not threaten marriage since 
those couples could not marry, inclusion of different-sex couples detracted from 
marriage’s channeling function.”). For a contrary account of this history, see, e.g., 
Melissa Murray, Paradigms Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went From Innovation to 
Injury, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 291, 297-99 (2013). 
 61 Cf. Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219, 
263 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/constitutional-
law/windsor%E2%80%99s-right-to-marry/ (noting that the marriage equality movement did 
not begin to achieve regular success until people saw LGBT relationships as worthy of equal 
dignity and respect). 
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relate to discriminatory or biased conduct. Both types of rules 
have implications beyond LGBT people. 
Marriage discrimination is one source of the legal 
vulnerabilities some LGBT couples and their families face. 
Although the law is changing, it remains the case that most 
same-sex couples cannot enter into marriages that are 
recognized as valid by their home states.62 As for transgender 
people, the vast majority of states lack clear guidance for 
assessing the validity of a marriage involving a transgender 
person.63 As a result, rules that turn on the existence of a valid 
marriage or the existence of some other formal familial 
relationship have a disproportionately negative impact on 
LGBT people.64 
To ensure that rules do not disproportionately and 
unfairly exclude LGBT people, it is critical to examine 
instances in which a right or protection—or conversely, a 
criminal provision—turns on the existence or lack of a marital 
or family relationship. There are many such provisions in the 
area of family law, ranging from provisions regarding legal 
parentage65 to others governing the distribution of property 
 
 62 As of January 2014, 17 states and the District of Columbia permit or soon 
will permit same-sex couples to marry. See, e.g., Gay Marriage, PROCON.Org, 
http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=004857 (last updated 
Jan. 6, 2014); Human Rights Campaign, Marriage Equality and Other Relationship 
Recognition Laws (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/marriage_
equality_1-14-2014.pdf. Stated in the converse, same-sex couples in the remaining 33 
states may not be able to enter into marriages that are considered valid in their home 
states. Gay Marriage, supra; Human Rights Campaign, supra; see also Human Rights 
Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibition Laws (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.hrc.org/
files/assets/resources/marriage_prohibitions_1-14-2014.pdf (providing that 29 states have 
constitutional amendments restricting marriage to heterosexual couples and that 4 
additional states have statutes restricting marriage to heterosexual couples). 
 63 Jennifer L. Levi, Forward, Symposium: Issues in Estate Planning for 
Same-Sex and Transgender Couples, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 671, 673 (2008) (“Just as 
same-sex couples face legal uncertainty regarding their status, so too do couples where 
one of the partners is transgendered.”). 
 64 Same-sex couples from anywhere in the U.S. can marry in any one of the 
jurisdictions that permit same-sex couples to marry; none of these jurisdictions has a 
residency requirement. Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-
Sex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1678 (2011). But if the 
same-sex couple lives in a state that does not permit them to enter into a same-sex 
marriage, it is very likely that that their home state will not recognize their marriage. 
See, e.g., Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibition Laws, supra note 
62 and accompanying text. 
 65 See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and 
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1177, 1184 (2010) (noting that 
“in the vast majority of states, the existing statutory provisions or common law address 
only the legal parentage of children born to married couples through alternative 
insemination”). 
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upon dissolution of the relationship.66 But family law is not the 
only area of law in which rights or protections turn on marriage. 
For example, most states’ criminal law and the ALI’s MPC treat 
marital rape differently than rape by someone other than a 
spouse.67 In the civil domain, the tort of alienation of affections 
applies only to the alienation of the affections of a spouse.68 
If one decided to deal with LGBT issues in a separate, 
LGBT-specific publication, one might devise a set of special 
rules that seeks to address the legal vulnerabilities faced by 
LGBT people. This LGBT-specific solution might be to create a 
separate legal familial status available only to same-sex 
couples, such as civil unions or domestic partnerships, or to 
advocate that same-sex couples be permitted to marry. Having 
purportedly “resolved” the challenges faced by same-sex 
couples, one might then think “our job is now done; we’ve 
solved the problem.” 
Resolving these specific legal inadequacies by creating a 
set of rules applicable only to LGBT couples, however, would 
leave many other families vulnerable. As Nancy Polikoff has 
explained, “the injustice same-sex couples suffer [as a result of 
marriage-based rules] is not unique.”69 Lesbian and gay couples 
are far from the only couples that are unmarried, and, 
therefore, are left vulnerable by a legal system that uses 
marriage as a prerequisite to a huge array of rights and 
protections. Increasing numbers of different-sex couples are 
cohabiting outside of marriage.70 But despite this reality, 
 
 66 See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Should Cohabitation Matter in Family Law?, 
13 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 289, 289 (2011) (“The fact of whether a married or unmarried 
couple is cohabitating may have a significant impact on a number of family law doctrines. 
Perhaps the best known of these doctrines involves the question of whether a party to non-
marital cohabitating relationship is entitled to a share of property accumulated by the other 
party during the relationship upon its termination.” (footnotes omitted)); Courtney G. Joslin, 
The Evolution of the American Family, 36 HUM. RTS. 2, 4 (2009) (noting that, “generally 
speaking, . . . unmarried cohabitants do not take on or acquire obligations to support each 
other or to share in their partner’s earnings”). 
 67 Jill Elaine Hasday, Protecting Them from Themselves: The Persistence of 
Mutual Benefits Arguments for Sex and Race Inequality, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1464, 1465 
(2009) (noting that “[a]t least twenty-four states . . . retain some form of a marital rape 
exception”); Morgan Lee Woolley, Note, Marital Rape: A Unique Blend of Domestic Violence 
and Non-Marital Rape Issues, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 269, 275 (2007) (“Most rape 
statutes, including the MPC, stipulated that rape was forced sexual intercourse with a 
woman not his wife, thus creating a marital rape exemption for husbands.”). 
 68 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683 (1976) (“Alienation of 
Spouse’s Affections”); see also WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 12, at 312 (noting 
that one of the elements of the tort of alienation of affections is “a valid marriage”). 
 69 NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING 
ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 123 (2008). 
 70 See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. 
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marriage remains a prerequisite for access to hundreds of 
critical rights and protections. Taking into account all of these 
changing demographics and family formation patterns is 
absolutely critical to engender thoughtful and effective reform. 
Historically, most people who could marry71 married and 
stayed married until they or their spouses died.72 In such a 
world, using marriage as the line for allocating rights and 
responsibilities made sense.73 But this pattern of behavior is 
simply no longer the overwhelming norm. “Between 1950 and 
2000, married-couple households declined from more than 
three-fourths of all households (78 percent) to just over one-half 
(52 percent).”74 And today, the number has now dropped below 
50%.75 As the number of married couples has decreased, 
cohabitation rates have increased dramatically. According to 
the U.S. Census, there were 523,000 cohabiting couples in 
1970.76 By 2000, this number had increased ten-fold, to almost 
5.5 million.77 And about 50% of people who marry will divorce 
at least once.78 In sum, there simply are many more adults who 
are living in non-marital relationships than there were in the 
past.79 Indeed, a 2010 Pew Study found that almost 40% of 
Americans report that marriage is becoming obsolete.80 
 
 71 Slaves were not permitted to marry. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, 
Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 11 
YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 251, 252 (1999) (“Antebellum social rules and laws considered 
enslaved people morally and legally unfit to marry.”). 
 72 See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 66, at 2. 
 73 Marriage also “played a crucial role in the creation and replication of the 
social and cultural roles for men and women.” Id. 
 74 U.S. Census Bureau, Demographic Trends in the 20th Century, at 2 (Nov. 
2002), http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf. 
 75 “The 2010 Census reported that, for the first time in history, married 
couples constituted fewer than one-half of all American households.” Erez Aloni, 
Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 580 (2013) (citing Sabrina Tavernise, 
Married Couples Are No Longer a Majority, Census Finds, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2011), 
http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/us/26marry.html). 
 76 See Ann Laquer Estin, Golden Anniversary Reflections: Changes in 
Marriage After Fifty Years, 42 FAM. L.Q. 333, 336 n.21 (2008). 
 77 Id. at 336. 
 78 ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE 
AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY 4 (2009). 
 79 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, Introduction, at 31 
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES] (“During the final quarter of the 20th century, all western 
countries experienced extraordinary growth in the rate of nonmarital cohabitation.”). 
 80 Pew Research Center, The Decline of Marriage and the Rise of New 
Families 21, 64 (Nov. 18, 2010) [hereinafter The Decline of Marriage], available at 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf 
(“Most adults ages 65 and older are critical of these unmarried couples, whether they 
are same-sex or opposite-sex couples. Most young adults, ages 18 to 29, are not.”). 
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Although it was not true historically, today, reliance on 
formal family status has profound racial and class 
implications.81 According to the same 2010 Pew Study: 
50 years ago there was virtually no difference by socio-economic 
status in the proclivity to marry: 76% of college graduates and 72% 
of adults who did not attend college were married in 1960. By 2008, 
that small gap had widened to a chasm: 64% of college graduates 
were married, compared with just 48% of those with a high school 
diploma or less.82 
The marriage rate gap is even greater for some racial or 
ethnic groups. “Blacks (32%) are much less likely than whites 
(56%) to be married, and this gap has increased significantly 
over time.”83 
Studies suggest that part of the reason for this growing 
socio-economic and racial divide is the belief of some people 
that they should delay marriage until they have achieved 
financial security.84 Changes in our economy have made this goal 
of financial security much more difficult to achieve.85 But 
whatever the reason, it is clear that cohabitation is on the rise, 
particularly among people with less education and fewer 
financial resources. 
In other words, not only does the use of marriage-based 
rules result in the exclusion of many lesbian and gay people, 
these rules also disproportionately exclude people of color and 
lower and middle-class people. And, more fundamentally, in 
many situations, marriage-based rules may no longer do a good 
job of correctly screening the people who should be entitled to 
those rights and protections.86 Thinking about LGBT issues in 
a vacuum would inhibit law reformers’ ability to think more 
reflectively and broadly about whether and in what 
 
 81 See, e.g., June Carbone, What Does Bristol Palin Have to Do with Same-Sex 
Marriage?, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 313, 324-25 (2010) (“The cumulative result of these 
[demographic and economic] changes is that family form has become a marker of class 
and culture. . . . For the poorest Americans, concentrated in urban centers, marriage 
has effectively disappeared.”). 
 82 The Decline of Marriage, supra note 80, at 23. 
 83 Id. 
 84 J. Herbie DiFonzo, How Marriage Became Optional: Cohabitation, Gender, 
and the Emerging Functional Norms, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 521, 542 (2011). 
 85 See, e.g., Carbone, supra note 81, at 321 (“The Journal of Economic 
Literature, for example, reports that that while wages across the population rose in 
lockstep through the 1960s, they began to diverge in 1970, with the top ten percent of 
the population enjoying a substantial increase in earnings that has accelerated since 
the 1980s, the middle stagnating, and the relative earning power of the bottom ten 
percent of males declining significantly over the last forty years.”). 
 86 For a comprehensive and thoughtful consideration of this question, see 
POLIKOFF, supra note 69. 
640 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:2 
circumstances marriage should continue to be a prerequisite to 
legal rights and protections. As Rachel Moran explains, 
“concerns about access to marriage are significant, but the 
most profound questions of justice could turn on how we rectify 
the gap between those who choose to express their affection 
through marriage and those who do not.”87 
Using marriage as a prerequisite for critical legal 
remedies and protections has a disproportionately negative effect 
not only on LGBT people, but also on lower income people and 
people of color. The important rights or provisions that turn on 
the existence of a valid marriage include, but certainly are not 
limited to, the right to sue for loss of consortium or for a wrongful 
death, and whether a forced sexual encounter is considered 
rape. In light of the importance of these provisions, and the 
large and growing number of couples who are living together 
outside of marriage, the ALI should carefully consider whether 
existing marriage-based requirements do a good job of identifying 
those people who should be entitled to a given right or remedy. 
And looking beyond provisions that turn on the 
existence of a marital relationship, addressing LGBT issues in 
a separate, stand-alone publication may reduce the likelihood 
of broader and deeper reflection about the extent to which 
existing bodies of law are shaped by and, in some cases, still 
reflect our discriminatory past. Many other scholars have 
written about how various bodies of law fail to adequately 
protect people who are the victims of discriminatory and biased 
conduct. For example, Martha Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins 
argue that “when viewed through a wider cultural lens, the basic 
structure of contemporary tort law still tends to reflect and 
reinforce the social marginalization of women and racial 
minorities and to place a lower value on their lives, activities, 
and potential.”88 It is only by reforming the doctrine as a whole, 
and not just as it applies to members of one particular group, 
that one can truly assess whether such biases exist and, if so, 
how to appropriately remedy them. 
 
 87 Rachel F. Moran, Beyond the Loving Analogy: The Independent Logic of Same-
Sex Marriage, in LOVING V. VIRGINIA IN A POST-RACIAL WORLD: RETHINKING RACE, SEX, AND 
MARRIAGE 252 (Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor eds. 2012). 
 88 CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 27, at 2. 
2014] RESTATEMENT OF GAY(?) 641 
 
III. IMPLEMENTING LGBT INCORPORATION 
A. The Law As It Is or As It Should Be? 
As explained above, we believe that LGBT issues should 
be incorporated into all existing and future ALI publications, 
rather than addressed in a separate, stand-alone publication. 
But how, exactly, should this incorporation be done? 
There is the preliminary question of what these ALI 
publications generally should aim to accomplish. Should the 
relevant ALI subject-matter publications simply restate the 
law as it is? That is, should the publication seek to cull the 
current majority approach to a thorny legal issue? Or should 
the publications be more aspirational and seek to state the law 
as it should be, regardless of its current state?89 
The answer may vary to some degree depending on the 
subject matter of the publication or the particular provision at 
issue.90 There are some areas of law where development and 
evolution are happening at a fairly rapid pace.91 Other areas 
are fairly well settled, at least relatively speaking.92 How 
aspirational the publication should be depends on where on 
this spectrum the particular body of law falls.93 That said, 
while there has been ongoing debate about what the 
Restatements should do,94 it seems clear to us that the 
 
 89 For more comprehensive discussions of this debate, see, e.g., V. William 
Scarpato, Comment, “Is” v. “Ought,” or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Restatement, 85 TEMPLE L. REV. 413, 414-15 (2013); Anita Bernstein, Restatement 
Redux, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1667-68 (1995) (reviewing JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT 
LIABILITY (1994)). 
 90 It will also be affected by the type of publication. Some ALI publications 
are more overtly aspirational in nature. Such publications include “Principles of.” 
Other publications, such as the Restatements, at least purport to be less aspirational. 
See, e.g., Publications Catalog, A.L.I., supra note 1. (comparing Principles to 
Restatements). 
 91 E.g., Intellectual Property. 
 92 E.g., Judgments. The Restatement of Judgments has not been revised since 
1982. See id. 
 93 See, e.g., James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field Theory of the 
Family: The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 
2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 923, 923-24 (2001) (noting that because of the “brisk pace of 
cultural and technological change” in the area of family law, a “Restatement” is 
“unthinkable”). 
 94 G. Edward White, From the Second Restatements to the Present: The ALI’s 
Recent History and Current Challenges, 16 GREEN BAG 2d 305, 319 (2013) (“Looking 
back to the formative years of the Second Restatements, one gets a sense that ALI 
projects have consistently struggled to define the relationship between black-letter 
principles and the policy dimensions of legal synthesis, and between the declarative 
and normative dimensions of lawmaking[.]”); see also Kristen David Adams, Blaming 
the Mirror: The Restatements and the Common Law, 40 IND. L. REV. 205, 206 (2007) 
(“Criticism of the American Law Institute and the Restatement movement is a common 
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Restatements are intended to and often do accomplish much 
more than simply restate the existing law.95 
As an example, even though much of tort law is fairly 
settled, the treatment of defective products in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts was highly innovative.96 Likewise, the treatment 
of duty in the Restatement (Third) of Torts is widely divergent 
from the approach of the majority of jurisdictions.97 And there are 
many other examples of aspirational Restatement provisions that 
do not simply state the law as it is. 
Moreover, we think it would be a missed opportunity if 
the drafters were limited to the goal of articulating the current 
state of the law. The drafters of the ALI publications are among 
                                                                                                             
phenomenon and comes from two sides. The critique from one side is that the 
Restatements are too activist, stating the law as the Institute believes it should be 
rather than the law as it is. The critique from the other side is that the Institute is too 
conservative—frozen in time in the late 1800s or early 1900s—and fails to incorporate 
the best contemporary practices in the study of law.” (footnotes omitted)); see also John 
P. Frank, The American Law Institute, 1923–1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 615, 617 (1998) 
(“A problem, which has confronted the Institute from then until now, was 
foreshadowed in that original committee report: the problem of the ‘is or the ought’; is 
it the function of a Restatement to report precisely what the law is, as by counting 
decisions, or should it give some consideration to what the law ought to be?”). 
 95 See, e.g., White, supra note 94, at 307 (quoting former ALI Director 
Herbert Wechsler as stating that “when the Institute’s adoption of the view of a 
minority of courts has helped to shift the balance of authority, it is quite clear that this 
has been regarded as a vindication of our judgment and a proper cause for exultation”); 
see also Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement 
Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 434 (2004) (“Despite the project’s name, some 
evidence suggests that the Restatements were never meant simply to re-state the 
common law of the United States.”); Green & Moréteau, supra note 4, at 292 (noting 
that a plaque hangs in the ALI Conference Room quoting Herbert Wechsler’s 
perspective that, while the majority law position should be given weight it “[sh]ould not 
be thought to be conclusive”). 
 96 See, e.g., Charles E. Cantu, The Recycling, Dismantling, and Destruction of 
Goods as a Foreseeable Use Under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
46 ALA. L. REV. 81, 81 n.1 (1994) (describing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS rule 
regarding defective products as “innovative”). Indeed, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS created the tort of strict products liability in the highly influential Section 402A, 
at a time when the concept “had almost no support in American jurisprudence.” Green 
& Moréteau, supra note 4, at 302; see also Stephen D. Sugarman, A Restatement of 
Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1163 (1992) (“Section 402A [of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts] did not ‘restate’ the dominant common law rule in America circa 1964; rather 
it reflected the judgment of the ALI as to what the law should be.”). 
 97 See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CALIF. 
L. REV. 671, 671-72 (2008) (“The Restatement (Third) of Torts (‘Third Restatement’) 
confronts the duty question head on, but has received stinging criticism for failing to 
restate the law.”). 
  For other examples of Restatement provisions that adopt minority 
positions, see, e.g., Andrew Russell, Comment, The Tenth Anniversary of the 
Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes: A Progress Report, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 753, 
761 (2011) (discussing how the Restatement of Servitudes, at least “[o]n its face 
significantly departs from the familiar elements of traditional servitude law (which it 
acknowledges courts still routinely use)”). 
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the leading legal thinkers in their respective areas of law. Where 
they are of the opinion that change is important and necessary, 
they should have the ability to advocate for that change.98 
In terms of assessing when the drafters should state the 
law as it should be rather than as it is, one of the co-reporters 
of the Restatement (Third) of Torts (Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm) and his co-author put it quite nicely: Deviation 
from the majority rule in a Restatement is the right thing to do 
“[w]hen there are sufficiently powerful reasons to reject a 
majority rule or to anticipate an incipient reform that has not 
yet fully taken hold.”99 For the reasons discussed below, we 
believe that a more forward-looking approach is appropriate 
with respect to many of the provisions affecting the rights of 
LGBT people. 
The demographics of and the law governing families and 
family relationships are changing at a rapid pace. As a result, 
not only is it difficult to “restate” the law as it is (because there is 
so much variation), but any such restatement would be quickly 
out of date. The ALI appears to have reached the same 
conclusion. Thus, the ALI’s recent publication on families—the 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution—forthrightly seeks to 
state not what the law is but what the law should be in order to 
serve today’s families.100 With regard to areas of law that are 
either widely criticized or are not keeping up with changes on 
the ground,101 this type of overtly reformist approach is not only 
appropriate but also necessary. Other areas of law may not 
require such wide-scale reevaluation and assessment, but even 
 
 98 Cf. Michael Traynor, The First Restatements and the Vision of the 
American Law Institute, Then and Now, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 145, 161 (2007) (“This might 
be a good time for the Institute to consider other areas of law where our work would 
seek to contribute to enlightenment and debate rather than to articulating definitive 
legal principles.”). 
 99 Green & Moréteau, supra note 4, at 294. 
 100 While there certainly has been a fair amount of criticism of particular 
conclusions reached by the drafters, see, e.g., RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 4 
(consisting of 25 articles critiquing various parts of the Principles), the Principles have 
provoked thoughtful and critically needed reflection on the current state of family law 
and the ways in which family law should evolve. 
 101 Both comments could be lodged against family law. To use just one 
example, scholars widely criticize the “best interest of the child” standard that is used 
by all fifty states with regard to child custody determinations. See, e.g., Katharine K. 
Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy by Valuing 
Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1559 (1998) (“Few legal standards have encountered 
as much criticism in as short a time as has the best interest of the child standard.”). 
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in these other areas, there may be individual rules that are in 
need of updating.102 
When one contemplates the inclusion of LGBT issues 
into ALI publications, it becomes even clearer that the relevant 
provisions may need to have a more aspirational goal. The process 
of drafting and adopting Restatements is “excruciatingly slow.”103 
Moreover, the revision process is only periodic; once the slow 
process of drafting a Restatement is complete, the process 
generally is not restarted for quite some time. For example, 
three decades passed between the completion of the second and 
the third Restatement of Torts.104 
By contrast, the law on LGBT issues is evolving at a 
rapid pace.105 If ALI publications simply stated what the law is, 
they would cement in place (in some areas of law, for an entire 
generation or more) law that has already or quickly will 
become outdated. The Restatement of Torts nicely illustrates 
this point. One of the very few places that the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts expressly mentions LGBT issues is with regard 
to recovery for bystander emotional distress.106 Section 48 of the 
Restatement provides that one can only recover for bystander 
emotional distress if, among other things, one is a “close family 
member.”107 Of course, in most jurisdictions in the United States, 
same-sex and other unmarried partners—even long-term, 
committed partners—are considered legal strangers, not “family 
members,”108 and therefore are unable to recover for this tort. 
 
 102 For example, as discussed above, while Torts is largely fairly settled, some 
rules have had to adapt over time to reflect new developments and understandings of 
the law. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
 103 Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code 
Annual Survey: Some Observations on the Past, Present, and Future of the U.C.C., 41 
BUS. LAW. 1343, 1347 (1986) (noting that “the study, promulgation, and enactment of 
uniform state laws and amendments is an excruciatingly slow and cumbersome process”). 
 104 Volumes 1 and 2 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS were published 
in 1965. Publications Catalog, A.L.I., supra note 1. The third edition of A Concise 
Restatement of Torts was published almost fifty years later, in 2013. Id. 
 105 See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, “Gen Silent”: Advocating for LGBT Elders, 19 
ELDER L.J. 289, 324 (2012) (“The legal landscape of marriage equality is evolving so rapidly 
that any attempt to describe the patchwork of relationship recognition laws that exist across 
the United States is quickly outdated.”); Susan Hazeldean, Confounding Identities: The 
Paradox of LGBT Children Under Asylum Law, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 373, 375 (2011) 
(“Only four years earlier, the Supreme Court had upheld the validity of sodomy laws that 
subjected LGBT people to criminal prosecution and imprisonment. Since then, the case law 
on LGBT rights has evolved rapidly.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 106 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 48 (2012). 
 107 Id. 
 108 Meredith E. Green, Comment, Who Knows Where the Love Grows?: 
Unmarried Cohabitants and Bystander Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1093, 1098 (2009) (“Among the class of plaintiffs 
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While the Reporters’ Note acknowledges the likelihood of this 
outcome, and while the Restatement’s accompanying comments 
suggest that courts “take into account changing practices and 
social norms and employ a functional approach” when defining 
what “constitutes a family,”109 the text of the Restatement itself 
does not mandate such an approach.110 
One of us111 contacted Michael Green, Reporter for the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, to discuss section 48 and its 
application to, and likely exclusion of, same-sex partners. 
Green was asked whether he felt he had the authority to draft 
a more inclusive Restatement provision, rather than just urge 
such a standard in the comments.112 While Green opined that 
as a Reporter he did have this authority, he acknowledged that 
they did not exercise this authority with regard to same-sex 
partners. Green noted, however, that much had changed in the 
last few years and that it is quite possible that if the section 
were drafted in 2013 rather than in 2007, it would have indeed 
advocated that same-sex couples in certain committed 
relationships be considered “close family members” entitled to 
sue.113 To the extent that ALI publications intend and purport 
only to restate what the law is, it is surely hard for the 
Restatements to have the agility to remain current, especially 
in areas of law that evolve at a rapid pace, like those affecting 
LGBT people. 
B. Incorporation Where? 
In undertaking the task of reviewing and potentially 
revising provisions that affect LGBT people, an important 
question arises: How should one go about identifying which of 
the thousands of provisions in the hundreds of ALI publications 
merit reconsideration and revision? One group of provisions 
that may be in need of revision are those provisions that turn 
on the existence of a family or marital relationship. By this, we 
do not only mean provisions in publications that focus on 
families and their rights, like the Principles of the Law of 
                                                                                                             
whom this [close family member] limitation has excluded, unmarried cohabitants have 
been especially affected[.]” (footnotes omitted)). 
 109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 48 
cmt. f (2012). 
 110 See infra Part III.D.1. 
 111 Professor Lawrence Levine. 
 112 Interview with Michael Green, Reporter for the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS (Jan. 16. 2013) (notes on file with authors). 
 113 Id. 
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Family Dissolution or the Restatement (Third) of the Law, Trusts. 
Instead, we mean any provision that uses a marital or family 
relationship as a prerequisite. This would include provisions 
criminalizing certain consensual sexual conduct114 or rape.115 It 
would also include spousal evidentiary privileges and relational 
torts that are available only to close family members. When the 
Restatements use the terms marriage or family, they refer to 
that status as a matter of the relevant state law.116 Thus, if the 
couple lives in a state that does not recognize marriages 
between same-sex couples,117 parties to that relationship will be 
excluded from those areas of tort, property, and criminal law 
that use marriage as a prerequisite. 
Relationship-based rights, however, are not the only 
areas where LGBT issues should be taken into account. 
Examples of other types of provisions that may also require 
additional reflection regarding their impact on LGBT people 
include provisions pertaining to discrimination. These provisions 
appear in a range of ALI publications, from the Restatement 
(Second) of Property: Landlord and Tenant,118 to the Restatement 
(Third) of Employment Law.119 Provisions that relate to a person’s 
 
 114 Historically, states criminalized sexual activity outside of the bounds of 
marriage. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime 
of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1888 (2012); Melissa 
Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of 
Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1268-69 (2009) (“Until the late twentieth century, 
the criminal law in most jurisdictions prohibited fornication—sex outside of marriage—
thereby highlighting marriage’s role as the licensed locus for sexual activity.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 
EMORY L.J. 809, 814-15 (2010) (“Criminal law traditionally prohibited and punished a 
wide range of sexual activity, including sex between unmarried people, [and] sex 
between a married person and someone other than his or her spouse[.]”). 
 115 Historically, marital rape was not criminalized. Joslin, supra note 66, at 2 
(noting that “[a]t common law, the concept of marital rape was a legal impossibility”). 
Even today, most states treat marital rape differently than rape by a nonspouse. Jill 
Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1373, 1375 (2000) (“A majority of states still retain some form of the common law 
regime: They criminalize a narrower range of offenses if committed within marriage, 
subject the marital rape they do recognize to less serious sanctions, and/or create 
special procedural hurdles for marital rape prosecutions.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 116 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, 
§ 48, cmt. f (2012) (“[T]his Section does require that the person seeking recovery be a 
close family member, howsoever defined by the jurisdiction[.]”). 
 117 And, as of January 2014, the vast majority of states still refuse to recognize 
marriages between two people of the same sex. Human Rights Campaign, Statewide 
Marriage Prohibition Laws (June 4, 2013), http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/
marriage_prohibitions_072013.pdf. 
 118 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3.1 (1976) 
(regarding “[r]estrictions on [f]reedom to [r]efuse to [l]ease,” including conduct 
prohibited by state and federal nondiscrimination statutes). 
 119 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.03 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2009) (“Wrongful Discipline in Violation of Public Policy”). 
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membership in a certain identity-based group—such as those that 
may apply in the defamation context—may also be in need of 
reconsideration.120 The concern raised by these two types of 
provisions121 is whether LGBT identity is being treated similarly 
to other types of identity-based characteristics. So, for example, 
with regard to defamation, the question would be whether being 
falsely accused of being gay is treated in the same way as being 
falsely accused of being African American or Latino.122 
C. Existing Examples of LGBT Incorporation 
An example of an existing ALI publication that 
comprehensively includes and takes account of LGBT people is 
the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution.123 The Principles 
do not single out LGBT issues or address them in separate 
provisions or sections. Instead, the Principles forthrightly apply 
equally to all families, without regard to the gender or sexual 
orientation of the parents.124 The Principles demonstrate an 
understanding and appreciation of how a growing number of 
unmarried couples should be treated under the law. The 
Principles largely take the position that there should be less, 
rather than more, difference in the legal treatment of married 
and unmarried couples.125 
Thus, although there are provisions in the Principles 
that apply to married couples,126 the same property division 
 
 120 See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT 
Plaintiffs, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1711, 1711 (2010) (discussing the application of a number 
of privacy torts to LGBT plaintiffs). 
 121 That is, those related to discrimination and those related to identity-based 
characteristics. 
 122 See infra Part III.D.2.B. 
 123 See, e.g., June Carbone, Back to the Future: The Perils and Promise of a 
Backward-Looking Jurisprudence, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 4, at 209 
(“The Principles strive to treat all families and intimate relationships on equal terms 
and insist on few, if any, preconditions for the recognition of family relationships.”). 
 124 For example, illustration 9 to § 2.03 of the Principles involves a same-sex couple. 
 125 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 79, at 34 (“Other countries primarily ask the 
question: Does this nonmarital family look like a marital family? If so, they apply some 
or all of their family law to the dissolution of the nonmarital family. . . . Chapter 6 
adopts this approach.”). For critiques of this approach, see, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, 
Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts and Law Reform, in RECONCEIVING THE 
FAMILY, supra note 4, at 332; Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic Partnership and Default 
Rules, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 4, at 269; Marsha Garrison, Marriage 
Matters: What’s Wrong with the ALI’s Domestic Partnership Proposal, in RECONCEIVING 
THE FAMILY, supra note 4, at 305. 
 126 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES, supra note 79, § 4.11 (Division of Property Upon 
Dissolution). 
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rules apply to “domestic partners.”127 Moreover, all of the rules 
apply equally without regard to the sex or sexual orientation of 
the parties.128 For example, the rules in Chapter 6 regarding 
property division between unmarried cohabitants apply to all 
unmarried cohabitants—same-sex or different-sex—who fulfill 
the relevant criteria.129 
And, again, as stated above, the overarching theme of 
the Principles is to elevate function over form when considering 
whether the relationship of the parties is such that they should 
be treated as a unit rather than as individuals. This premise 
applies to both the economic provisions and to the provisions 
regarding children. Thus, under both the custody and child 
support provisions, there are a variety of circumstances where 
a non-marital partner would have parental rights and/or 
obligations even when he or she lacks a legal parent-child 
relationship.130 And these rules apply equally to same-sex 
couples. Same-sex couples are included in the Principles 
without regard to their sexual orientation. If same-sex couples 
are married, they are treated as a married couple. If same-sex 
couples are unmarried, they are treated as “domestic partners” 
provided they fulfill the relevant criteria.131 This result is not 
an accident. The drafters explicitly chose to include same-sex 
couples and to treat them equally.132 
 
 127 See, e.g., id. § 6.05 (“Domestic-partnership property should be divided 
according to the principles set forth for the division of marital property[.]”). 
 128 See, e.g., id. at 34-35 (“Chapter 6 generally defines domestic partners as 
‘two persons of the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a 
significant period of time share a primary residence and a life together as a couple.’”). 
 129 See, e.g., id. § 6.03 (defining “domestic partners” to mean “two persons of 
the same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period of 
time share a primary residence and a life together as a couple”). 
 130 See, e.g., id. § 2.03(1)(b)(iii) (providing that a person is a parent by estoppel 
if he or she has “lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting 
full and permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting 
agreement with the child’s legal parent . . . to raise a child together each with full 
parental rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition of the 
individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests”); id. § 3.03(1) (providing that a 
court may impose child support on a person who is not a legal parent when the person’s 
“prior course of affirmative conduct equitably estops that person from denying a 
parental support obligation to the child”). For an insightful discussion of the tension or 
lack of consistency between the child custody and child support standards, see 
Katharine K. Baker, Asymmetric Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra 
note 4, at 121. 
 131 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES, supra note 79, § 6.03(1) (“For the purpose of defining 
relationships to which this Chapter applies, domestic partners are two persons of the 
same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a significant period of time 
share a primary residence and a life together as a couple.”). 
 132 See, e.g., id. (defining domestic partner to include couples of the “same or 
opposite sex”). 
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Again, while one may disagree with particular rules 
adopted by the drafters, the drafters’ approach in thinking both 
holistically and inclusively about the subject matter is 
commendable, and it is the type of approach we hope will serve 
as a model for future ALI projects. 
D. Examples of Needed LGBT Incorporation 
As described above, there are examples of ALI 
publications that, at least in some respects, have succeeded in 
incorporating LGBT concerns. There are, however, other ALI 
publications or parts of ALI publications that deserve more 
consideration, reflection, and possibly revision. The Restatements 
of Torts serve as good examples of such publications.133 The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts took an approach reflective of the 
time in which it was drafted. At the time of its adoption in 1965, 
the Second Restatement did not include a single mention of 
sexual orientation.134 The Restatement (Third) of Torts fares 
somewhat better, as it includes LGBT issues and cases in some of 
the Comments and Notes.135 But there is more work to be done.136 
There are a number of provisions in the Restatements of 
Torts that have a particular impact on LGBT individuals. 
While others could be discussed, here we choose to limit 
ourselves to three such areas: relational harms, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and defamation.137 
1. Relational Torts 
An obvious place for the consideration of LGBT issues is 
relational torts, such as bystander emotional distress, loss of 
 
 133 There are many other publications that fall into this category. We discuss 
the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS here because it is within our areas of expertise. 
 134 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). In more recent years, courts 
have applied some of the Second Restatement provisions in LGBT contexts, as noted in 
the Appendices to the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS. 
 135 See infra Parts III.D.1–2. 
 136 Other scholars have explained how the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS fails to 
adequately address concerns of race and gender. See, e.g., supra notes 24-28. In 
addition to our concerns about the application of principles adopted by or advocated for 
in ALI publications to LGBT people, as we discuss herein, we are also concerned about 
their application to members of other marginalized groups, including women and 
people of color. 
 137 The public duty doctrine is another such area of tort law. See, e.g., Brandon 
v. Cnty. of Richardson, 566 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Neb. 1997) (finding an exception to the 
public duty doctrine when a police officer failed to arrest a transgender rape victim’s 
assailants and those assailants subsequently shot and killed the victim). The tort for 
invasion of privacy is another. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 120, at 1711. 
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consortium, and wrongful death. As noted earlier, a starting point 
for creating a more LGBT-inclusive Restatement is to focus on 
those provisions that rely on a marital or family relationship.138 
We start by considering bystander recovery for negligently 
inflicted emotional distress. The Third Restatement permits 
recovery only to a percipient witness who suffers serious 
emotional distress arising from the infliction of bodily harm to “a 
close family member.”139 There has been ample litigation about 
who constitutes a “close family member.”140 Persons in a close and 
committed relationship short of legal marriage have largely 
been unsuccessful in their efforts to recover for bystander 
negligent infliction of emotional distress because most courts 
have required proof of a legal marriage as a prerequisite to 
recovery.141 Because gays and lesbians are prohibited from legal 
marriage in most jurisdictions,142 the legal claims for bystander 
emotional distress are foreclosed for most LGBT people.143 And, 
 
 138 See supra Part III.B. 
 139 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, § 48 
(2012). In so doing, the THIRD RESTATEMENT adopts something akin to the approach 
taken by the California Supreme Court in Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 
(Cal. 1989). In Thing, the court adopted the requirements that the claimant 
contemporaneously perceive the harm-causing event and have a close family 
relationship with the victim. Id. at 815. Many other jurisdictions have adopted a 
similar approach. See, e.g., Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 863 (Conn. 1996); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 48 cmt. f (2012). 
  Although the THIRD RESTATEMENT broadens recovery from that of its 
predecessor, it continues to treat recovery for emotional harm more restrictively than 
physical injury or even property damage. This more restrictive treatment of emotional 
injury grows out of American tort law’s concerns about disproportionate liability and 
feigned claims. See JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS 160-61 (4th ed. 
2010); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 821-24 (2000). While our focus is on 
the Restatement’s impact on LGBT persons, it should be noted that a restrictive view 
of emotional distress also negatively impacts other vulnerable and marginalized 
groups. Women, for example, have been particularly harmed by the continuing 
undervaluation of emotional injury. See Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, 
Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 816 (1990); see also 
CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 27, at 92 (noting that although the “rules 
governing emotional and relational harms are stated in gender-neutral terms, . . . 
[they] tend[ ]  to place women at a disadvantage because [these] important and 
recurring injuries in women’s lives are more often classified as lower-ranked”). 
 140 See, e.g., Trombetta v. Conkling, 626 N.E.2d 653, 655 (N.Y. 1993). 
 141 A typical example is Smith v. Toney, 862 N.E.2d 656, 661-62 (Ind. 2007), in 
which the Indiana Supreme Court refused to allow the victim’s fiancée to recover. 
Similarly, in Coon v. Joseph, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1269, 1272 (1987), the court held that an 
intimate same-sex relationship did not constitute a “close relationship” for purposes of 
bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
 142 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 143 To date, only a few courts have permitted non-married cohabitants to 
recover for bystander negligent infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Paehl v. 
Lincoln Cnty. Care Ctr., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1254 (D.N.M. 2004); Graves v. 
Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255, 1262 (N.H. 2003) (permitting engaged different-sex 
cohabitant to recover); Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994). 
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as noted above, the large and growing number of other non-
marital couples are also precluded from protection under this 
standard.144 Moreover, and more importantly, as a few courts 
have noted, requiring a marital relationship does not necessarily 
do a good job of identifying the people who are most harmed.145 
The current Third Restatement forthrightly 
acknowledges that there is an ongoing debate about the 
definition of “family” as it applies to bystander emotional distress 
recovery.146 To their credit, the drafters encouraged jurisdictions 
to “take into account changing practices and social norms and 
employ a functional approach to determine what constitutes a 
family.”147 Indeed, in urging a “functional approach” to the 
definition of “close family member,” the drafters hinted at their 
support for permitting those “living together in a stable, mutually 
supportive, and emotionally dependent relationship” to be 
included within the definition of family.148 As for LGBT couples 
specifically, Comment f cites two references that favor a broader 
and LGBT-inclusive vision of family: a 2010 New York Times 
article149 and the book Counted Out: Same-Sex Relations and 
Americans’ Definitions of Family.150 
A more overtly inclusive approach, however, is called 
for; one that is not based on a formal legal status, but instead 
is based on a variety of functional criteria. The recognition of 
the debate and the citation to some authority that supports the 
broadening of recovery to include some same-sex couples151 is a 
far cry from outright adoption of that position.152 In our view, 
the Restatement missed an important opportunity. Because of 
the influence of the Restatements of Torts,153 the adoption of an 
 
 144 See supra Part II.B.2. 
 145 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. For a thoughtful and 
comprehensive analysis of marriage requirements, see POLIKOFF, supra note 69, at 2-5, 123. 
 146 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 48 
cmt. f (2012). 
 147 Id. (“[T]his Section does require that the person seeking recovery be a close 
family member, howsoever defined by the jurisdiction[.]”). 
 148 Id. (citing a few of the cases that permit non-married individuals to recover 
for bystander emotional distress recovery). 
 149 Sam Roberts, Study Finds Wider View of “Family,” N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 
2010, at A.14. 
 150 BRIAN POWELL ET AL., COUNTED OUT: SAME-SEX RELATIONS AND 
AMERICANS’ DEFINITIONS OF FAMILY 13-15 (2010). 
 151 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 48 cmt. f (2012). 
 152 Cf. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 27, at 18 (“Even when the 
Restatement explicitly ventures ‘no opinion’ on a particular aspect of doctrine . . . it 
cannot be taken at face value. Instead, such a disclaimer may be implicitly expressing 
the normative judgment that the matter is not of sufficient importance to justify taking 
a position.”). 
 153 See supra Part II. 
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explicit position of inclusion would have gone a long way 
toward influencing legal developments regarding bystander 
emotional distress claims by gays and lesbians, as well as other 
non-marital couples.154 
We recognize that taking a position advocating an 
expansion of what constitutes a “close family relationship” 
engenders debate not only about the propriety of including 
gay and lesbian couples, but also about how to determine 
which non-marital couples should be allowed to recover for 
bystander emotional distress. Because some courts are deeply 
concerned about expansive liability for bystander emotional 
distress, they have adopted bright-line, marriage-based 
limitations on recovery.155 
The adoption by courts or by the ALI itself of a more 
inclusive, functional approach would not be unprecedented. 
Although it is certainly a minority position, some courts have 
permitted unmarried heterosexual and homosexual couples in 
committed relationships to recover for bystander emotional 
distress.156 Indeed, almost 20 years ago, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court recognized that the “family relationship” 
required for bystander emotional distress recovery extends 
beyond relationships of legal marriage, noting: 
An intimate familial relationship that is stable, enduring, 
substantial, and mutually supportive is one that is cemented by 
strong emotional bonds and provides a deep and pervasive emotional 
security. We are satisfied that persons who enjoy such an intimate 
familial relationship have a cognizable interest in the continued 
mutual emotional well-being derived from their relationship.157 
And the ALI itself has already endorsed a similar, more 
flexible and functional understanding of family in its Principles 
 
 154 In author Levine’s conversation with Reporter Michael Green regarding 
this section, Green acknowledged that while the reporters should act with restraint 
and humility, the drafters could have taken the position that same-sex committed 
couples constitute a “close family member[ ] ” for purposes of bystander negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. As 
Reporter Green noted, none of the ALI members (including author Levine) actually 
advocated that such a position be taken. Absent such pressure, restraint by the 
reporters seemed appropriate. Interview with Michael Green, supra note 112. 
 155 See, e.g., Clohessy v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 863 (Conn. 1996); Thing v. La 
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989). 
 156 See, e.g., Paehl v. Lincoln Cnty. Care Ctr., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1254 
(D.N.M. 2004); Graves v. Estabrook, 818 A.2d 1255, 1262 (N.H. 2003) (permitting engaged 
different-sex cohabitant to recover); Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994). 
 157 Dunphy, 642 A.2d at 380. See generally Green, supra note 108, at 1093 
(advocating that the legal status of the parties should be only one of several factors in 
determining who may recover for bystander emotional distress). 
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of the Law of Family Dissolution.158 Specifically, rather than 
relying solely on formal legal relationships created under state 
law, the Principles also uses multi-factor, functional tests to 
determine whether the parent-child relationship159 or the adult-
adult relationship160 is entitled to protection. For example, to 
decide whether parties are entitled to protections as “domestic 
partners,” courts are instructed to consider a range of functional 
criteria, including how long they have lived together, whether 
they have a child in common, oral or written promises they have 
made to each other, and the extent of intermingling of their 
finances.161 The Restatement (Third) of Torts could have—and 
should have—adopted this more flexible and modern position. 
The tort of loss of consortium—providing recovery for 
the loss of comfort, companionship, and access to sexual 
relations162—raises similar issues of exclusion.163 Here, too, 
LGBT individuals and other unmarried couples largely have 
been barred from recovery due to the lack of legal recognition of 
their relationships.164 A more inclusive approach, one that is 
based on the nature rather than the legal form of the 
relationship, is in order.165 
Broadening the types of familial relationships entitled 
to legal recovery may be the most challenging in the context of 
wrongful death. State statutes dictate which family members 
 
 158 PRINCIPLES, supra note 79, at 33 (“As the incidence of cohabitation has 
dramatically increased and cohabitation has become socially acceptable at all levels of 
society, it has become increasingly implausible to attribute special significance to the 
parties’ failure to marry.”). 
 159 Id. § 2.03. 
 160 Id. § 6.03. 
 161 Id. 
 162 See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 139, at 160. 
 163 For example, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693 (1977) limits 
recovery for loss of consortium to “spouse[s].” Section 693 of the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS provides that “[o]ne who by reason of his tortious conduct is liable 
to one spouse for illness or other bodily harm is subject to liability to the other spouse 
for the resulting loss of the society and services of the first spouse.” Id. § 693(1). 
 164 Typical of the approach taken by most courts is that of the Florida 
Appellate Court in Bashaway v. Cheney Bros., Inc., in which the court refused the 
plaintiff ’ s loss of consortium claim despite uncontroverted evidence of an exclusive and 
long-term, committed lesbian relationship with the tortiously injured party. 987 So. 2d 
93, 96 (Fla. App. 2008). The court reached this result despite a history of expansion of 
consortium rights in the state of Florida. Id. at 94; see also, e.g., Mueller v. Tepler, 33 
A.3d 814, 818 (Conn. App. 2011). Professor Culhane suggests that courts have been 
particularly resistant to expanding the scope of loss of consortium claims to unmarried 
persons because sexual intimacy of the relationship is a key component of the damages. 
John G. Culhane, A “Clanging Silence”: Same-Sex Couples and Tort Law, 89 KY. L.J. 
911, 950 (2001). 
 165 Again, this approach would not be unprecedented. See, e.g., Lozoya v. 
Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 961 (N.M. 2003) (allowing persons with intimate familial 
relationships with the injured party to recovery for loss of consortium). 
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may bring a wrongful death claim. As is true with the other 
relational torts discussed above, those in non-marital 
relationships who suffer the economic and emotional harm of the 
death of a partner are unable to recover in most jurisdictions.166 
Thus, it remains the case that in the majority of jurisdictions, 
LGBT people will not be able to recover under this standard.167 
The Restatement should urge states to adopt a more flexible 
standard for assessing who is entitled to sue for wrongful death.168 
As the ALI recognizes in the Principles,169 in at least 
some contexts, using marriage as a bright-line prerequisite for 
important rights and protections is no longer consistent with the 
realities of contemporary family life. It often unfairly denies 
recognition of, and protection to, functionally equivalent 
relationships, and it is inconsistent with the trajectory of the 
law. Accordingly, these relational torts are examples of 
provisions in which the ALI should urge the deviation from the 
current majority rule. 
2. Other Torts 
Although torts involving relational injury are those that 
most directly cry out for revision, there are other areas of tort 
law that affect the lives of LGBT individuals in ways worthy of 
inclusion in any effort to restate the law of torts. These areas 
tend to be provisions that can, in some cases, turn on a right to 
recover for discriminatory conduct. Here, we note two of the 
many areas where the current or future Restatements of the law 
of torts should consider the impact of the law on LGBT 
individuals: intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
defamation. These examples are intended to be illustrative, not 
exhaustive; the complete list of provisions in need of 
reconsideration would be more extensive. 
In these areas, there are two overriding concerns that 
reformers should bear in mind. First, there is a concern about 
whether people who experience harm based on real or perceived  
 166 John G. Culhane, Even More Wrongful Death: Statutes Divorced from 
Reality, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 174 (2005); see also, e.g., Langan v. St. Vincent’s 
Hosp. of N.Y., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005), rev’g 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2003), appeal dismissed, 817 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (denying 
recovery for a civil union spouse); Raum v. Rest. Assocs., Inc., 675 N.Y.S.2d 343, 348 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (denying recovery for a nonmarital partner). 
 167 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 168 The California legislature, for example, expanded the coverage of the 
state’s wrongful death statute to include those in registered domestic partnerships. 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.60 (West 2013). 
 169 See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
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sexual orientation or gender identity receive equal treatment as 
compared to people who experience harm based on other identity 
characteristics. Second, there is also a more general concern 
about whether tort law provides adequate relief for, and 
recognition of, the harm caused by such conduct. 
a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts’ treatment of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress largely fares well on 
the first concern regarding similar treatment, but may require 
more consideration with regard to whether it provides 
adequate relief. 
The Third Restatement’s treatment of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, at least implicitly, integrates 
LGBT issues in a manner similar to that which we advocate 
here. At various places, the drafters include cases that involve 
LGBT individuals seeking to recover for their emotional injury.170 
Further, the intentional infliction of emotional distress section 
implicitly suggests that the claims of LGBT plaintiffs should be 
treated similarly to the claims of women and people of color.171 
The ALI takes a step in the right direction by implicitly 
suggesting that these forms of biased treatment should be 
treated similarly. The drafters, however, should go further and 
include a clearer statement to help ensure that state tort law 
comports with such an inclusive approach.172 
Although the provision addresses adequately the equality 
concern, the high standard adopted by the Restatement may 
 
 170 The Notes in Section 46 cite Brandon v. County of Richardson, 624 N.W.2d 
604 (Neb. 2001), in which the court found that a police officer’s brutal questioning of a 
transgender sexual assault victim was extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, § 46 cmt. d (2012). 
Further, Comment j includes a reference to a case in which a supervisor’s sexual-
orientation based verbal attack was deemed extreme and outrageous, although the 
plaintiff ultimately lost the claim because the court did not find the injury sufficiently 
severe to justify a claim for IIED. Id. § 46 cmt. j. 
 171 Id. 
 172 There is one aspect of the new Section 46 that is of concern, however, for 
reasons similar to those discussed in Part III.D.1. Like the SECOND RESTATEMENT, the 
THIRD RESTATEMENT grapples with the issue of third party recovery for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. The THIRD RESTATEMENT limits recovery for emotional 
harm to “bystanders” who are “close family members and who contemporaneously 
perceive the event.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 46 cmt. m (2012) (suggesting that the spousal limitation is “justified by the 
generalization that the harmed person’s close family members are more likely to suffer 
severe emotional harm than are strangers or acquaintances”). By so doing, the same 
concerns raised with regard to other relational torts are implicated. We advocate a 
similar inclusive approach here. 
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wrongly bar some worthy claims for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. The Third Restatement largely adopts its 
predecessor’s approach. Thus, to be actionable, a plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant intentionally or recklessly engaged in 
extreme and outrageous behavior that caused severe emotional 
distress.173 The Third Restatement defines “extreme and 
outrageous conduct” as conduct that “goes beyond the bounds of 
human decency such that it would be regarded as intolerable in 
a civilized community.”174 The drafters of this section made clear 
that this standard (along with the requirement of proof of severe 
emotional distress) is designed to create a high threshold for 
recovery.175 By noting that “ordinary insults and indignities are 
not enough for liability to be imposed” for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress,176 the Third Restatement continues to adhere 
to the traditional approach where even the worst kinds of insults 
are deemed inadequate for recovery because such bad behavior is 
just a part of our culture to which people need to adjust.177 
Indeed, under the Third Restatement’s approach, even 
racist, sexist, and homophobic insults—hate speech designed to 
harm the recipient’s psyche by reinforcing a history of 
 
 173 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (2012). 
 174 Id. § 46 cmt. d (2012); see also, e.g., Lewis v. Schmidt Baking Co., Inc., 16 
F.3d 614, 615 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 175 In fact, the THIRD RESTATEMENT in Section 46 repeatedly advocates that 
judges play a particularly active gatekeeping function regarding this “extreme and 
outrageous” standard in order to prevent the tort “from being so broad as to intrude on 
important countervailing policies,” such as the freedom of speech. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (2012); see also MacDermid v. 
Discover Fin. Servs., 488 F.3d 721, 732 (6th Cir. 2007) (“‘[T]he outrageousness 
requirement is an ‘exacting standard’’”); DAN DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 48 (2d 
ed. 2011). 
 176 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. 
d (2012). 
 177 See, e.g., Brown v. Zaveri, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2001) 
(denying recovery to African-American plaintiff when a manager of McDonald’s refused 
to serve him and hurled hateful racist epithets at him because the conduct was not 
extreme and outrageous as a matter of law); see also Rosalie Berger Levinson, Targeted 
Hate Speech and the First Amendment: How the Supreme Court Should Have Decided 
Snyder, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 45, 75 (2013) (“Because of the restricted nature of IIED, 
the burden imposed on expression by subjecting speakers to tort liability for targeted 
hate speech is minimal.”). 
  The THIRD RESTATEMENT recognizes that even within its narrow view of 
what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct, particularly hateful insults may 
give rise to liability when they were launched by a person in a position of power against 
someone in a subordinate or dependent position (such as a supervisor against an 
employee or a police officer against a crime victim). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. d (2012). The drafters acknowledge that sexual 
orientation-based insults may give rise to liability in the abuse of authority context just like 
other forms of particularly hateful speech although, again, the THIRD RESTATEMENT so 
provides only implicitly by citing to two cases raising this issue. Id.; id. § 46 cmt. j. Again, 
ideally, Section 46 of the THIRD RESTATEMENT would have made this clearer. 
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subjugation and mistreatment178—are seen as just a part of our 
culture that traditionally mistreated and particularly 
vulnerable persons simply have to accept.179 This approach 
ignores the well-documented harmful effects of discriminatory 
hate speech.180 
The Restatement could have adopted an aspirational 
standard of what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct. 
That is, the drafters could have chosen not to use a test that 
accepts boorish and mean-spirited behavior as the norm. 
Powerful arguments have been made that liability under a 
theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress181 or a new 
intentional tort182 should be imposed on at least some forms of 
hate speech and other discriminatory conduct. And as we noted 
above, in some circumstances, it is appropriate for the 
Restatements to depart from the majority approach and to 
state the law as it should be rather than as it is.183 This may be 
one area of law in which further consideration and reflection is 
warranted.184 
 
 178 See, e.g., Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage, supra note 25, at 2127 
(“For the most part, courts do not equate discrimination with outrageous conduct . . . . 
[C]ourts have refused to classify discrimination as per se outrageous and have even 
hesitated to declare the ‘severe’ or ‘pervasive’ harassment required to prove a Title VII 
claim of hostile environment sufficient to satisfy the threshold tort requirement of 
‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Leslie Bender, 
Teaching Torts as if Gender Matters: Intentional Torts, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 115, 
147 (1994) (“[F]ew cases ever seem to meet the threshold of extreme and outrageous 
conduct necessary for intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. . . . Rarely are 
these issues addressed so directly in a judicial opinion; . . . gender matters and affects 
how, when and why the court finds causes of action to exist.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 179 Logan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 So. 2d 121, 124 (Ala. 1985) (holding 
that “[i]n order to create a cause of action, the conduct must be such that would cause 
mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities, not 
conduct which would be considered unacceptable merely by homosexuals”). 
 180 See, e.g., Ronald Turner, Regulating Hate Speech and the First 
Amendment: The Attractions of, and Objections to, an Explicit Harms-Based Analysis, 
29 IND. L. REV. 257, 293-98 (1995) (laying out the many harms of hate speech). 
 181 See, e.g., Jean C. Love, Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123, 159 (1990); see also 
Okainer Christian Dark, Racial Insults: “Keep Thy Tongue From Evil,” 24 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 559, 562 (1990). 
 182 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial 
Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 181 (1982); Mari 
J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, in MATSUDA 
ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND 17, 34-35 (1993); cf. Julie Seaman, Hate Speech and Identity 
Politics: A Situationalist Proposal, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 103-05 (2008). 
 183 See supra Part III.A. 
 184 Indeed, as Professor Chamallas explains, “the tort of [IIED] has been knee-
deep in issues relating to gender, sexuality, and personal morality” since its creation. 
Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage, supra note 25, at 2121. 
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b. Defamation 
Currently, there is no Restatement of Torts project that 
seeks to review the complex law of defamation. But if and when 
such a project is undertaken, there will be an opportunity to 
clarify one of the most complex and confused areas of American 
tort law.185 This undertaking would also provide an opportunity 
for the drafters to ensure that anti-LGBT conduct is treated 
similarly to other forms of discriminatory conduct.186 Consistent 
with the way the law has evolved with regard to race and 
ethnicity, the drafters could clarify that false imputations that 
a person is LGBT should no longer be considered defamatory. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that “[a] 
communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the 
community or to deter third persons from associating or 
dealing with him.”187 The Second Restatement further provides 
that the harm to the plaintiff ’s reputation must be “in the eyes 
of a substantial and respectable minority,”188 a position adopted 
by many courts.189 Other courts use a similar concept and 
require that the plaintiff ’s reputation be harmed in the eyes of 
a “right-thinking” person.190 Regardless of which test a 
jurisdiction applies, a statement that lowers the reputation of 
 
 185 Defamation law is particularly complex because of the conflict between its 
original goal of making it easy to recover for reputational harm and the countervailing 
First Amendment concerns of protecting the freedom of speech and of the press raised 
by permitting such an easy recovery. Also, there have been several significant opinions 
by the United States Supreme Court that have altered defamation law mightily since 
the Restatement last dealt with the issue in 1977. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 139, 
at 356; RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 5.26 (2d ed. 2003). 
 186 This issue has engendered substantial scholarly commentary. See generally 
Matthew D. Bunker et al., Not That There’s Anything Wrong with That: Imputations of 
Homosexuality and the Normative Structure of Defamation Law, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 581, 601 (2011); see also Jay Barth, Is False Imputation of 
Being Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Still Defamatory? The Arkansas Case, 34 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 527, 527, 542 (2012); Robert D. Richards, Gay Labeling and 
Defamation Law: Have Attitudes Toward Homosexuality Changed Enough to Modify 
Reputational Torts?, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 349, 356, 368-69 (2010); Haven Ward, 
“I’m Not Gay, M’Kay?”: Should Falsely Calling Someone a Homosexual be Defamatory?, 
44 GA. L. REV. 739, 766 (2010). 
 187 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). 
 188 Id. § 559 cmt. e. 
 189 See, e.g., West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1009 (Utah 1994). 
 190 See, e.g., Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 1996); DIAMOND ET 
AL., supra note 139, at 357-58. 
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the plaintiff only among some bigoted or otherwise largely anti-
social group is not actionable.191 
The concept of what is defamatory has evolved over 
time. Based on the “right-thinking” or “respectable minority” 
approach, what is considered defamatory changes based on such 
things as “the temper of the times [and] the current of 
contemporary public opinion.”192 With the passage of time and the 
development of more tolerant attitudes, communications assumed 
to be defamatory in the past no longer sustain a claim for 
defamation. Thus, it is now well-settled that a false statement that 
a Caucasian person is African-American or of mixed-race cannot be 
found to be defamatory even though it was in the past.193 
The ALI should make clear that the result should be the 
same with regard to false assertions that a person is gay or 
lesbian. Although to date no court has expressly determined 
that a false imputation of homosexuality can never be 
defamatory, some recent court decisions have moved in that 
direction.194 Further, in light of both cultural and constitutional 
law developments, it is hard to justify a rule that permits a 
false imputation of LGBT status to be defamatory. 
In the years both before and directly after Bowers v. 
Hardwick,195 courts often concluded that false imputations of 
homosexuality were defamatory per se196 because most states had 
criminalized private, consensual same-sex sexual conduct.197 But 
the legal and cultural landscape has changed significantly over 
the last decade. Bowers was forcefully overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas.198 Lawrence struck down the “dozen or so . . . sodomy 
laws that still existed . . . in the country” and recognized the 
 
 191 See, e.g., DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 139, at 358 (“If the group that could 
interpret the communication in a way that injures the plaintiff ’ s reputation is 
blatantly anti-social, courts may deny the plaintiff a defamation action.”). 
 192 Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Mencher 
v. Chesley, 75 N.E.2d 257 (N.Y. 1947)). 
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dignity and right to equal treatment “of homosexual 
persons.”199 As of January 2014, 17 states and the District of 
Columbia permit or soon will permit same-sex couples to 
marry.200 Likewise, public attitudes about gays and lesbians 
have shifted dramatically.201 
Consistent with these changes, a number of courts have 
recently rejected defamation claims brought by people who 
were falsely accused of being LGBT. In 2004, for example, a 
federal district court reasoned that in light of Massachusetts’ 
broad nondiscrimination protections for LGBT individuals and 
the state’s expansion of marriage rights to include same-sex 
couples, false imputations of sexual orientation were not 
defamatory per se.202 As the court explained: “If we were to agree 
that calling someone a homosexual is defamatory per se—it 
would, in effect, validate the sentiment and legitimize relegating 
homosexuals to second-class status.”203 Even more recently, a New 
York appellate court refused to follow precedent that had 
established that false imputations of homosexuality were 
defamatory per se, reasoning that to do so would have wrongly 
suggested that there was something shameful or disgraceful 
about being gay, lesbian, or bisexual.204  
 199 Levine, supra note 41, at 10-11. 
 200 Supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 201 See Jeffery M. Jones, Same-Sex Marriage Support Solidifies Above 50% in 
U.S., GALLUP (May 13, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162398/sex-marriage-support-
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If and when the ALI revisits the tort of defamation, the 
ALI should explicitly endorse the emerging trend in the case 
law and make clear that, as is true for false imputations of 
race, false imputations of homosexuality should not give rise to 
a cognizable defamation claim. A determination that sexual-
orientation defamation cannot be actionable would be a 
substantial step toward recognizing the dignity of the LGBT 
community.205 
CONCLUSION 
The ALI makes itself more influential and relevant 
when it deliberately and comprehensively takes steps to ensure 
that its publications keep up with changes in the law. This is 
no less true with regard to LGBT issues. Incorporating LGBT 
issues into all existing and future ALI publications would be 
entirely consistent with the purpose of the ALI, as the ALI was 
founded to modernize our concepts of “the law.”206 Indeed, as 
stated in its Certificate of Incorporation, part of the ALI’s mission 
is to ensure the law’s “better adaptation to social needs.”207 
As we have explained above, the most appropriate way 
to grapple with LGBT legal issues is through an inclusive 
rather than an exclusive approach. That is, rather than 
attempting to address LGBT issues through a separate, stand-
alone publication, we urge the ALI to be mindful of how any and 
all of its provisions apply to LGBT people. Moreover, given the 
speed of evolution in this area of the law, when undertaking this 
inclusive revision, these provisions will often call for a more 
reformist rather than a static approach to drafting. 
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endorsing homophobia. In so finding the courts effectively legally sanction 
homophobia.” (footnotes omitted)). 
  Indeed, in light of constitutional developments, it may no longer be 
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courts permit sexual-orientation defamation suits, they entangle themselves with anti-
LGBT animus in precisely the way that the Supreme Court has tried to prohibit.”). 
 205 By the time the topic of defamation is revisited by the ALI, it is likely that 
some courts will have adopted the position we advocate. Moreover, to the extent that 
some courts are still lagging behind, it is not unprecedented for the ALI to lead the 
way. The ALI has done this before, and will surely do so again in other contexts when 
there are “powerful reasons” to do so. Green & Moréteau, supra note 4, at 294. 
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Further, this inclusive approach would not be a new path 
for the ALI. Over half a century ago, the ALI took bold steps to 
advocate for the reform of the law in ways that positively affected 
LGBT individuals.208 We think that such an undertaking would 
prove very worthwhile and important. Keeping up to date with 
the evolution of the law is critical to the ALI’s continued influence 
and relevance. And, if undertaken, the approach we propose has 
the potential to positively impact the development of the law. We 
hope it is one that the ALI embraces. 
 
 208 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing how the MPC’s treatment of private, 
consensual sodomy was in many aspects a major departure from existing law in a way 
that was protective of LGBT rights). 
